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Reviewed by David Kayet
Statistical methodology has become an increasingly important tool
in a surprising variety of disciplines. Business majors are exposed to
econometrics. Medical students are taught biostatistics. Even education
majors are confronted by psychometrics. Lawyers and law students,
however, have remained remarkably unaffected by and ignorant of
formal statistical thinking. "Jurimetrics" is a word coined by a few
political scientists who, by brute empiricism, generate mathematical
models of judicial decisions.' No more than a handful of law schools
have offerings in probability or statistics, and it is an unusual lawyer
who knows that regression analysis is not available from his psycho-
analyst.
In these circumstances, Michael Finkelstein is something of an
anomaly. A New York lawyer and an adjunct professor at Columbia
University, Finkelstein has tirelessly advocated the use of statistical
techniques in legal analysis and decisionmaking. His early work on
inferring the likelihood of jury discrimination on the basis of a bi-
nomial probability distribution model2 has become an accepted tool in
resolving claims of discrimination in grand jury selection.3 His plea
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for the incorporation of Bayesian analysis in the evaluation of quan-
titative identification evidence4 has found less favor among courts and
commentators, 5 but it has stimulated the most lively and penetrating
discussions of statistical proof to date.6
In Quantitative Methods in Law,7 Finkelstein collects these and other
essays and presents them in an engaging and updated format. The ad-
ditional topics discussed include the application of the "one-man, one-
vote" reapportionment doctrine to multimember districts, the quantity
of voting irregularities necessary to mandate a rerun of a challenged
primary election, the measurement of market concentration as a guide
for merger policy, the extent of minimum reserves insurance companies
should be required to maintain, and the use of econometric models in
administrative proceedings. No prior background in statistics is as-
sumed, for the volume is directed to lawyers, not mathematicians. To
the extent that its aim is to persuade this audience that statistical tools
have their place in litigation, administrative proceedings, and legal
analysis, the book is, I think, eminently successful.
This is not to say, however, that every quantitative technique of
value to the law is studied or even that the limitations of the tech-
niques considered are critically delineated.8 The book is not intended
and would not serve as a primer on statistics for lawyers. It is best read
as a sampler, intended to whet the palate and to illustrate some basic
ideas. The approach is often both original and idiosyncratic, and the
conclusions controversial even among partisans of courtroom mathe-
matics. This review will examine one of Finkelstein's more dubious
arguments. I should hasten to add, however, that his analysis is novel,
stimulating, and pertains to a fundamental problem in the law of
4. Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1970).
5. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Deci-
sions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021
(1977). But see Wagner, Book Review, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1071; Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities
and Proof: Can Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity? (forthcoming 55 N.Y.U. L. REv.
(1980)).
6. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Trial by Mathematics]; Finkelstein &
Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics," 84 HARv. L. REV. 1801 (1971); Tribe, A
Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (1971); Fairley, Prob-
abilistic Analysis of Identification Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1973); Brilmayer &
Kornhauser, supra note 5; Gerjuoy, The Relevance of Probability Theory to Problems of
Relevance, 18 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1977); Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the
Land (forthcoming 46 U. CHI. L. REv. (1979)).
7. M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF
MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
8. See Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 5.
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evidence. Indeed, the point he raises has even prompted one philos-
opher and a few academic lawyers to conclude that probability theory
must be radically reformulated if it is to account for the rules govern-
ing legal fact-finding.9
The problem is the attempt to articulate, in starkly quantitative
terms, the burden of proof in civil cases. Hornbook law has it that in
most civil cases, the plaintiff must establish all the essential elements
of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 A majority of courts
and almost all commentators have concluded that this standard is satis-
fied by evidence that indicates to the trier of fact that the event that
must be established is more likely to have occurred than not."' Never-
theless, this "more-probable-than-not" interpretation has precipitated
acute discomfort when applied to what might be called naked statistical
evidence. In Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Company," for in-
stance, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, while adopting a
"greater-chance-than-not" test, nevertheless insisted that it is
not enough that mathematically the chances somewhat favor a
proposition to be proved; for example, the fact that colored auto-
mobiles made in the current year outnumber black ones would
not warrant a finding that an undescribed automobile of the
current year is colored and not black, nor would the fact that only
a minority'of men die of cancer warrant a finding that a particular
man did not die of cancer.13
This well-known dictum' 4 is the starting point for Finkelstein's
treatment of the conventionally accepted more-probable-than-not stan-
dard. He first observes, quite correctly, that this standard has the
virtue of minimizing the total number of incorrect verdicts. To illus-
9. Other arguments are also adduced in support of this conclusion. See L. COHEN,
THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977); Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 5. This
thesis is criticized in, e.g., Kaye, supra note 6; Schum, Book Review, 77 MICH. L. REV.
446 (1979).
10. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 793-94 (2d ed. 1972). In certain types of civil
cases, a heavier burden may be imposed on the plaintiff. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) (constitutional requirement of clear and convincing evidence
in civil commitment proceeding). In addition, certain evidentiary rules may shift the
burden from plaintiff to defendant in some circumstances. See, e.g., Weiss v. Axler, 137
Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958) (minority position on procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur).
11. E.g., R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY 109 (1978); C. MCCORMICK
supra note 10, at 794.
12. 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940).
13. Id. at 250, 29 N.E.2d at 827.
14. See, e.g., Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof,
14 VAND. L. REv. 807, 818 (1961); Winter, The Jury and the Rule of Nonpersuasion, 5
LAw & SoC'Y REv. 335, 338 (1971).
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trate the logic of his argument, suppose that in a class of cases tried to
the court, plaintiffs must prove some disputed fact X in order to prevail.
Imagine that a numerically minded judge, after hearing all of the
evidence pertaining to X in each of these cases arising in a given year,
writes his best estimate of the probability of X in a small black note-
book. In a few rather shoddy cases, the p(X) he records is close to zero.
In some unusually compelling cases, p(X) approaches one. In most in-
stances, p(X) falls somewhere between these two extremes.
Now suppose that the judge asks us to formulate a rule to tell him
when the probability is high enough to justify resolving X in plain-
tiff's favor. He reveals that he is interested only in making correct
decisions and avoiding incorrect ones-correct in the sense that, in the
long run, the decisions will correspond to the true state of affairs as
often as possible. Finally, he gives us the secret notebook in which he
has recorded the year's worth of probability estimates.
We inspect the notebook and rearrange the probability estimates to
form a table showing the number of times (n) that the probability takes
on various values.15 In this way we uncover the following pattern:
p .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
n 0 0 2 6 10 20 20 60 30
That is, of all the cases heard, the probability in favor of plaintiff was
never .1 or .2. It was .3 in two instances, .4 in another six cases, and so
on. If the judge's estimates are good, so that we can take them as
accurate statements of the probability of X,16 we can speak of the ex-
pected number of correct decisions under various decision rules.'
7
For example, in the twenty cases in which p is .6 we should expect
20 X .6 = 12 of them to be cases in which the disputed fact X was as
plaintiff claimed. On this basis, if the judge decided all twenty cases in
favor of plaintiff, his expected number of correct decisions would be
twelve, and the expected number of mistakes would be eight. Plainly,
if mistakes are to be minimized, these cases should be decided for
15. In this illustration p is taken to be discrete for ease of exposition. In the foot-
notes that generalize this example, p is allowed to be continuous on the interval [0,1], and
n(p) is akin to a probability density function.
16. Some commentators have questioned whether such an assumption can be made.
Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 141.
17. According to a corollary of the statistician's "law of large numbers," the actual
number of correct decisions approaches this expected number in the limit as the number
of cases approaches infinity. See, e.g., H. BRUNK, AN INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATisTics 153 (Corollary C) (3d ed. 1975). In common parlance, this is known as the
"law of averages."
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plaintiffs. Pursuing this logic to the bitter end reveals that the judge
makes the least mistakes if he adopts the following decision rule:
resolve X in plaintiff's favor when p is greater than one-half; otherwise,
find in defendant's favor.' 8 This result, furthermore, is not an artifact
of the numerical example given here. It is quite general and holds for
distributions of any shape.' 9
The more basic question is why minimization of the total number
of errors is the summum bonum of civil litigation. Finkelstein poses
this issue and purportedly resolves it by insisting that there is a com-
peting goal of "equalization," or allocating errors to plaintiffs and de-
fendants in roughly equal proportions. This goal, Finkelstein suggests,
often leads to a more stringent standard than the "more-probable-than-
not" test. In this way he defends the dictum in Sargent, concluding that
18. Another decision rule that works just as well prescribes a decision for plaintiff
whenever p equals or exceeds .5. The rule in the text incorporates the accepted legal
convention of deciding issues in which p(X) = .5 in favor of defendant.
19. Let n(p) be the frequency distribution of the probabilities p over the N cases
decided in some time period. Then N=fo n(p)dp.
Under a decision rule that mandates decisions for plaintiff whenever p > po, the expected
number of erroneous decisions for plaintiffs will be
N,7r = f o(l-p)n(p)dp.
PO
The expected number of erroneous decisions for defendants is given by
NeA = foP0 n(p)dp
To find the value of p. that minimizes the expected total number of errors N, = N7r +--
NeA, we set dN./dp, = 0, solve for p., and find that the critical value of p0 is indeed .5.
One can prove more generally that the p > .5 decision rule is error-minimizing by
considering stochastic decision rules. Let a general decision rule be specified by a func-
tion a(p) on the domain [0,1] and with range [0,1], where 5(p) is the probability of find-
ing for plaintiff given the value of p; that is, in a case involving evidence such that there
is a probability p that plaintiff is right, it can be understood to say that the jury should
decide which way to rule by drawing from an urn in which a fraction a(p) of the lots
are for plaintiffs. The error-minimization problem is then to minimize
N = N + NoA ----- fl(I -p)n(p)a(p)dp + fopn(p)[l -(p)]dp
foPn(p)dp + f0 (1 - 2p)n(p)8(p)dp
The first integral does not depend on a(p); the second is minimized by that function
which minimizes [(I - 2p)n(p)a(p)] independently for each value of p. This will mean
choosing 5(p) as large as possible when (I - 2p) is negative, and as small as possible when
(I - 2p) is positive. Thus, resolving cases in which p =.5 in favor of defendants as in
note 18 supra, the optimal decision rule is
= I ifp >.5
) 0 ifp <.5
This is, of course, the p > .5 decision rule.
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"the rejection of statistical evidence which establishes a proposition by
a preponderance of probabilities is not necessarily inconsistent with
the preponderance of evidence standard, since that standard may in-
volve a higher level of proof if the decision maker seeks to equalize
errors."
20
How then does this criterion of "equalization" operate? By "equal-
ization" Finkelstein appears to mean making the same expected number
of erroneous decisions for plaintiffs as for defendants. 2'1 This is indeed
a very different criterion than minimization of errors. There are many
distributions of p in which the more-probable-than-not (p > .5) decision
rule will lead, as Finkelstein remarks, to a larger incidence of erroneous
decisions in favor of plaintiffs as opposed to defendants (or vice versa).22
Consider, for example, the probabilities estimated by our imaginary
judge. Deciding by the more-probable-than-not rule yields 130 deci-
sions for plaintiffs and only eighteen for defendants. The expected
number of errors favoring defendants will be
(I X0) + (.2X0) + (.3X2) + (.4X6) + (.5X 10) = 8,
and the number favoring plaintiffs will be
(1-.6) X 20 + (1-.7) X 20 + (1-.8)x 60 + (1-.9) X 30 = 29.
The p > .5 rule is thus very one-sided. Nearly four-fifths of the errors
accrue to the benefit of plaintiffs. Following Finkelstein's suggestion,
we would enhance "equality" by moving up from p > .5 to, say, p >
.65. That is, the judge would decide for defendant whenever his prob-
ability estimate is .65 or less and for plaintiff only when the case is
especially strong, so that the estimate exceeds .65. Under this rule,
there will be twenty expected errors favoring defendants and twenty-
20. P. 69.
21. Mistakes, he says, "must come in pairs and be equal in number." P. 68. In the
terminology of note 19 supra, this is to say that
PO
N 07 r
= NeA, i.e., fIl- p)n(p)dp f pn(p)dp.
P0 0
One might equally well have supposed that the criterion for "equality" should be
POI = NA / NA, where Nr = Jon(p)dp and NA = f n(p)dp.
22. When n(p) is symmetrical about p = .5, the p > .5 rule not only maximizes the
total number of expected correct decisions, but also assigns the correct decisions to plain.
tiffs and defendants in equal numbers (and, for that matter, in proportion to the number
of decisions for plaintiffs and defendants, respectively). Since the function 1 - p (for .5 <
p < 1) is the mirror image of the function p (for 0< p <.5) about the line p =.5, it
follows that N.7T = NoA if n(p) is also symmetric about .5.
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one favoring plaintiffs. In sum, "equalization" here calls for a more
demanding standard of proof and entails more errors, but when it errs,
it errs in a more "equal" way. Nor is this picture unique to this ex-
ample. As long as the center of the distribution tends toward values
favoring plaintiffs, "equalization" can be achieved only by deciding X
for plaintiffs when p(X) is rather larger than .5, thereby increasing the
gross number of errors.2 3
Nevertheless, in invoking this criterion of "equalization" to explain
the reluctance of courts to permit proof by naked statistical evidence,
Finkelstein is enticed into a diverting but ultimately unsatisfying frolic.
To begin with, the same logic can be used not to justify, but to criticize
the Sargent dictum. If the distribution of the probabilities peaks at or
leans toward some central value below one-half, then "equalization"
requires that plaintiffs prevail on the basis of statistical (or other)
evidence that flunks even the minimal p > .5 standard. In these situa-
tions Finkelstein's argument suggests that courts should welcome still
weaker statistical evidence than that which was frowned upon in
Sargent.24
More fundamentally, why should we care about "equalization" in
the first place? Mistakes do not cancel one another out: it is no solace
to the defendant who should have prevailed but did not that some-
where there is or will be a similarly affected plaintiff. Unless plain-
tiffs and defendants are different sorts of people such that defendants
deserve to be favored, I cannot imagine why we should seek this sort
of "equality." There is nothing unfair in telling any defendant that he
is liable to plaintiff because we are more convinced that the truth lies
on the side of plaintiff than defendant. Indeed, to deny recovery to
plaintiffs in these circumstances seems the greater injustice. What are
we to say to these plaintiffs? "Ordinarily you would have won, for your
23. For N,1- to equal N.A under a decision rule that specifies decisions for plaintiffs
whenever p > p., the following equality must hold:
Po
fki(l-p)n(p)dp = f pn(p)dp
Expanding the first integral and rearranging terms, we find
f "n(p)dp = N f'p n(p) dp = NF0 N
Thus, for a given distribution n(p), the value of p. that achieves "equalization" is not
generally .5. Rather, p. is such that n(p) integrated from p. to 1 equals the total number
of cases multiplied by the mean value of p for the given distribution.
24. Finkelstein implies that there is reason to believe that the distributions n(p) al-
most always peak or are skewed to the right of p = .5. P. 78. Since no such reasons are
stated, it remains less than obvious that "equalization" affects the choice of p0 in the
way Finkelstein desires.
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case was quite strong; however, because of the large number of even
stronger plaintiffs' cases this year, we had to award a few decisions to
otherwise undeserving defendants!"
Moreover, Finkelstein himself starts from a premise that precludes
his reliance on this formalistic "equalization" criterion, even as a minor
supplement to the more basic minimization principle. He explicitly
agrees with other writers25 that "the burden of an error is deemed to
be the same for both parties.12 6 By this, I take it he means that the
disutility of an incorrect decision for one party is the same as that of
an incorrect decision for the other and, by extension, that the utilities
of correct decisions are similarly related.27 Since a rational decision-
maker will act to maximize expected utility, and because the p > .5
decision rule achieves maximization,28 it follows that the more-prob-
able-than-not standard does incorporate the only meaningful principle
of equality between plaintiffs and defendants-and the one principle
Finkelstein himself accepts as a basic premise.
It thus appears that Finkelstein's novel attempt to escape the prob-
lem of naked statistical evidence posed in the Sargent court's dictum
fails. Is the Sargent court simply wrong in its treatment of statistical
25. Finkelstein quotes from Vaughn Ball's The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory
and Standards of Proof, supra note 14, at 817. P. 66. For other treatments of this point,
see, e.g., Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of
the Subjective Approach, 1969 U. TOL. L. REv. 538; Kaplan, Decision Theory and the
Fact-finding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968); Lempert, supra note 5; Trial by
Mathematics, supra note 6. The Supreme Court has also opined that under the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard the litigants "share the risk of error in roughly
equal fashion." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
26. P. 67. Without mentioning the work of Cullison, Kaplan, Tribe, supra note 25, and
Lempert, supra note 5, all of whom show that equating the burden of errors for plaintiffs
and defendants implies the p> .5 decision rule, Finkelstein makes the unsupported asser-
tion that "[i]f the burden of errors is deemed to be the same for both parties, the aim
should be equal rates of errors for both parties over some assumed class of cases." P. 67.
In so doing, Finkelstein seems to confuse the "burden" (or, better, disutility) of mistakes
for individual litigants with some sort of aggregate "burden."
27. On the meaning of "utility" in this context, see, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC
THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 420-36 (4th ed. 1977); J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGEN-
STERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 15-31 (3d ed. 1955); Kaye, Playing
Games with Justice: Rawls and the Maximin Rule (forthcoming in 6 Soc. THEORY & PRAC.
(1980)).
28. If the utility of a correct decision (whether for plaintiff or for defendant) is U,
and the utility of an incorrect decision (whether for plaintiff or for defendant) is U,,
then a rule prescribing decision for plaintiff whenever p > p0 will result in the following
aggregate utility:
U = Uo(N-No7 .- NoA) + Uo(No + No.9 = UN + (OU-U)No.
Assuming U 0 >Uo, aggregate utility will therefore be maximized by whatever rule
minimizes N.. As indicated in note 19 suPra, this rule is the p > .5 standard.
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evidence?209 Must we abandon the usual interpretation of the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard? Or is it the axioms of probability
theory that are in need of repair?30 I wish to argue for the orthodox
view that a party shoulders its burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence by persuading the finder of fact that the probability in
question exceeds one-half. Yet, the Sargent court is essentially correct
in its claim that statistical evidence involving numbers larger than
one-half is often insufficient to warrant a finding for a proponent of
purely statistical evidence.31
My argument is most easily developed with the aid of the subjective
interpretation of probability. 32 To a mathematician, probability is a
number assigned to a set or subset of events. To qualify as a prob-
ability, such numbers must conform to a few simple axioms from
which the usual rules associated with flipping fair coins or drawing
cards from a well-shuffled deck can be derived. For example, these
mathematical probabilities are such that if the probability of an event
X is denoted p(X), then the probability of the complementary event
not-X is 1-p(X).
Although this explication of probability theory may provide an in-
ternally consistent system for calculating probabilities, it cannot tell
us what the probability numbers really stand for. Attempts to answer
this question have generated two main schools of thought.33 Objective
interpretations of probability hold that the numbers are premised
either on mutually exclusive, equally likely elementary events, or on
the relative frequencies with which observed events occur. In con-
trast, the subjective view attempts to quantify the strength of belief
held by a rational person concerning the occurrence of events. Since
the factual issues disputed at trial ordinarily do not constitute equally
29. See Winter, supra note 14 (criticizing the Sargent dictum as a departure from the
proper p > .5 standard).
30. See p. 603 supra; Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 141-46; Nesson, Rea-
sonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. Rxv.
1187, 1199 n.27 (1979).
31. In what follows, I draw on the articles cited in note 25 supra, and especially on
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 6. I part company, however, with Glanville
Williams, who accepts the orthodox interpretation by an argument that commits him to
a view that, he concedes, is "[n]o doubt . . . illogical." Williams, The Mathematics of
Proof I, CRIu. L. Rav., May 1979, at 305.
32. Finkelstein discusses the nature of probability at pp. 63-65. Generalizing from a
deterministic model of coin flipping, Finkelstein suggests that there is no fundamental
difference between the objective and subjective interpretations. P. 64. This claim is dis-
puted by Brilmayer &- Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 140, although their attack is premised
on a rather uncharitable reading of Finkelstein's suggestion.
33. See generally, e.g., V. BARNETr, COmPARATIVE STATISTICAL INFERENCE 62-88 (1973);
T. FINE, THEORIES OF PROBABILITY: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUNDATIONS (1973).
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likely, mutually exclusive events and do not repeat themselves so as to
produce relative frequencies, this subjective or "personalistic" theory
is more suitable for modeling litigation.34 Subjective probabilities can
be shown to obey the usual probability axioms as long as the person's
risk-related preferences obey a few plausible postulates. 35
This distinction between objective and subjective interpretations of
probability is particularly helpful to the conundrum posed by naked
statistical evidence. The opinion in Sargent apparently presupposes that
the probabilities determined "objectively" from automobile manu-
facturers' records or from death certificates must be taken to be the
subjective probabilities in question. Suppose, to make the Sargent
dictum a bit more concrete, that a life insurer has excluded coverage
for death caused by cancer, that the insured has died, and that forty-
five percent of American males die from cancer. The opinion in
Sargent seems to suggest that the probability that a particular de-
ceased did not die from cancer is 1-.45 = .55. But this does not nec-
essarily follow, for at least two reasons. First, it may be appropriate
as a matter of policy to treat the subjective probability as less than
one-half, and therefore insufficient to support a finding that the in-
sured did not die from cancer, simply to "create an incentive for plain-
tiffs to do more than establish the background statistics." 36 Second, in
addition to observing that forty-five percent of American males die
from cancer, a fact finder can legitimately consider the fact that plain-
tiff is relying on this statistical generalization and nothing more. Un-
less there is some satisfactory explanation for plaintiff's failure to do
more than present gross statistics, a rational judge or juror might well
arrive at a subjective probability of less than one-half that the insured
did not die of cancer.37 Hence, there is no need to modify the standard
34. But see Kaye, sutra note 6, for an attempt to apply an objective interpretation.
35. See, e.g., L. SAVAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATIsrIcs (2d ed. 1972). For an illustration of
how such subjective belief can be quantified, see, e.g., Trial by Mathematics, suPra note
6, at 1347. An engaging and compact sketch of the historical development of some of the
subjective theories can be found in H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 273-78 (1968).
36. Trial by Mathematics, supra note 6, at 1349. Or, one might say, to further the
policy of minimizing the total number of errors (and maximizing utility), the threshold
probability must be raised above one-half in cases of naked statistical evidence, since this
will encourage the production of more particularized and revealing evidence.
37. This last point can be shown to follow directly from the mathematics of prob-
ability theory. All that is required is an elementary version of Bayes's formula that in-
dicates how new information affects a previously established probability. Denoting the
"prior probability" as p(X) and the "posterior probability" as p(XfE), the formula states:
p(ElX)p(X)
p(X/E) = p(E/X)p(X) + p(E/not-X)p(not-X)
Suppose the fact finder accepts the statistic about the incidence of cancer fatalities at face
value. For him, the subjective probability based on this evidence alone (the "prior prob-
610
Vol. 89: 601, 1980
Statistical Evidence
of proof (the p > .5 decision rule), as Finkelstein suggests, to meet the
concern raised in Sargent.
As I noted at the outset, I have focused on what I believe to be one
of the weaker points in Quantitative Methods in Law. My discussion
has shown that the generally accepted quantitative interpretation of the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard (p > .5) can be reconciled with
the intuitively compelling skepticism of naked statistical evidence
voiced in Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Company. In the process,
I have demonstrated that under this standard the litigants, as the
Supreme Court has recently observed, do indeed "share the risk of
error in roughly equal fashion." 38 But even if Finkelstein's "equaliza-
tion" criterion is not required to understand the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard, there is much to ponder and to learn in Quanti-
tative Methods. The book deserves a wider audience than it probably
will receive.
ability") that the insured died from something other than cancer is .55. But if he stops
to reflect on the fact that this is all there is to the case, he should revise this probability
in light of this new item of "evidence," E-the gap in plaintiff's case. In particular,
according to Bayes's formula, the revised subjective probability p(X/E) will be one-half
or less as long as it is merely 1.22 times more likely that plaintiff would have been able
to come forward with more evidence about how the insured died if he had in fact died
from cancer than if he had not. See Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other
Stories, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 101, 106 & 108 n.36; Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. Rav. 1456, 1475-81 (1979).
38. See note 25 supra.
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